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PATENT ROYALTIES EXTENDING BEYOND EXPIRATION:  AN 
ILLOGICAL BAN FROM BRULOTTE TO SCHEIBER 
A recent decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Scheiber v. 
Dolby Laboratories, Inc.,1 called into question, yet dutifully applied, the 
somewhat disfavored Supreme Court patent case of Brulotte v. Thys Co.2   
For thirty-eight years, Brulotte has served as an absolute prohibition on 
the collection of any patent royalties extending beyond the expiration 
date of the patent.  As Justice Douglas stated in writing for the eight-
Justice majority, “a patentee’s use of a royalty agreement that projects 
beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se.”3   
Ostensibly, this concise and easily-applied exposition of the law seems 
sensible enough.  But, the devil is in the details.  This iBrief highlights 
the flawed reasoning underlying Brulotte as evidenced by its application 
in Scheiber, but ultimately concludes that overruling the case may be of 
little help to Mr. Scheiber in his suit against Dolby. 
Introduction 
The basic tenet underlying patent law is a very simple quid pro quo:  in exchange for 
public disclosure of the nuts and bolts of an invention, Congress is constitutionally empowered to 
grant to the inventor an exclusive right to the invention disclosed for a limited time.4   While the 
basic idea is simple enough, an interesting situation arises when private parties intentionally 
contract beyond the twenty-year grant5 in order to optimize the mutual economic benefits of their 
agreement.  Absent any foul play, one might think notions of freedom of contract make such 
agreements allowable, and indeed desirable.  But alas, one would be wrong - at least according to 
the teachings of Brulotte, where a nearly unanimous Supreme Court held such agreements 
“unlawful per se.”6  That this precedent, nearly four decades old, remains good law was reiterated 
at the unfortunate expense of musician-turned-inventor Peter Scheiber7 in his dealings with Dolby 
Laboratories.8 
                                                     
1 Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 71 U.S.L.W. 3471 
(2003). 
2 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964). 
3 Id. at 32. 
4 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
5 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994). 
6 Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 32. 
7 Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1016. 
8 See id. at 1018. 
Scheiber Meets Brulotte 
Peter Scheiber, inventor of the “surround sound” audio system, held several patents on 
this technology both in the United States and in Canada.9  Scheiber’s last United States patent 
was scheduled to expire in 1993, while his last Canadian patent was scheduled to expire in 
1995.10  In 1983, Scheiber sued Dolby for infringement.11  Rather than undertaking the expense of 
litigation, the parties agreed to settle on a licensing contract.12  During negotiations Dolby 
proposed to Scheiber that in exchange for lower royalty payments (and hence, increased sales), it 
would continue paying beyond the expiration of the United States patents until 1995, when the 
last Canadian patent expired.13  Scheiber agreed to these terms.14  However, upon expiration of 
the United States patents in 1993, Dolby discontinued its royalty payments and Scheiber filed 
suit.15 
Dolby rationalized its actions based on the Brulotte rule:16  “a patentee’s use of a royalty 
agreement that projects beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se.”17  In 
Brulotte, the Thys Company sold hop-picking machines incorporating several of its patents.18  In 
addition to the flat sum for the physical machines, Thys also licensed the machines based on the 
machines’ incorporation of the patents.19  Under this license, the purchasers paid royalties to Thys 
in various amounts depending upon their use of the machines.20  Since the license extracted 
royalties extending beyond the term of the patent grants, the purchasers discontinued payment 
when the patents expired.21 
Over the dissent of Justice Harlan, Justice Douglas’ majority opinion invalidated the 
license agreement as “a bald attempt to exact the same terms and conditions for the period after 
the patents have expired as they do for the monopoly period.”22  While recognizing the legitimacy 
of using the patent as leverage to exact royalties as high as possible during the life of the patent, 
the Court deemed it improper to use that same leverage to exact lower royalties for a term 
                                                     
9 Id. at 1016. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1016. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 1017. 
17 Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 32. 
18 Id. at 29. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 30. 
22 Id. at 32. 
extending beyond the life of the patent.23  The Court analogized post-expiration royalty 
agreements to tying arrangements, whereby a monopolist uses its power in one market to leverage 
itself into another market.24  In other words, since the patentee has a monopoly in the pre-
expiration market for his product, a patentee cannot use that monopoly as leverage into the post-
expiration market.25  Although the Court seemed to acknowledge that equality of bargaining 
power could exist between a patentee and licensee in entering into this type of agreement,26 it 
nevertheless erected an insurmountable barrier by creating a per se rule of invalidity.27 
 Thus, under the Brulotte rule, Dolby had a virtual slam-dunk because Chief Judge 
Posner’s opinion for the court found the two cases to be “indistinguishable.”28  To be sure, the 
court gave Scheiber’s arguments every chance.29  In fact, the court made its distaste for the rule 
abundantly clear, characterizing it as “dubious” in reasoning,30 “out of touch with the Supreme 
Court’s current thinking,”31 and even “silly.”32  But neither Scheiber’s arguments nor the court’s 
fundamental disagreement with the rule allowed disregard of such a strong per se rule of 
invalidity.33 
                                                     
23 Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 33. 
24 Id. 
25 See Note, An Economic Analysis of Royalty Terms in Patent Licenses, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1198, 
1217-22 (1983), for an extended discussion of tying pre-expiration royalties to post-expiration 
royalties. 
26 See Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 32.  The Court stated that since the “present licenses draw no line 
between the term of the patent and the post-expiration period,” it was “unable to conjecture what 
the bargaining position of the parties might have been and what resultant arrangement might have 
emerged had the provision for post-expiration royalties been divorced from the patent and nowise 
subject to its leverage.” 
27 Id. 
28 Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1017. This assertion is not technically correct because in Brulotte the 
license was limited to use of the particular machines sold by Thys.  379 U.S. at 29-30.  The 
license in Scheiber applied to equipment manufactured by Dolby that incorporated the Scheiber’s 
patents.  293 F.3d at 1017.  However, this distinction is to Scheiber’s detriment because even 
Justice Harlan’s Brulotte dissent found post-expiration royalty agreements of this sort to be 
impermissible.  379 U.S. at 35 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
29 See Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1019 (although the reasoning of Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 
440 U.S. 257 (1979), seems to support Mr. Scheiber’s argument against Dolby, the case is 
inapposite because the Aronson Court explicitly distinguished and reaffirmed Brulotte).  See also 
Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1019-21 (the 1988 amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) is limited to 
infringement suits in which tying is alleged between two products); id. at 1021-23 (the doctrine of 
“unclean hands” is limited to equitable relief). 
30 Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1018. 
31 Id. 
32 Audio recording:  Scheiber oral argument, available at 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/farg/arg.fwx?submit=showar&caseno=01-2466_001.mpg (Dec. 3, 
2001). 
33 Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1018. 
The Fusion of Precedent 
The legal basis for the rule set forth in Brulotte is essentially a fusion of two distinct lines 
of Supreme Court precedent, neither being clearly on-point.  The first is derived from Scott Paper 
Co. v. Marcalus Manufacturing. Co.34  In that case, Marcalus was the patentee of a packaging 
machine which it assigned to Scott Paper for valuable consideration.35  However, upon 
discovering a pre-existing expired patent thought to invalidate the assigned patent, Marcalus 
began to manufacture the packaging machine itself without first obtaining a license from Scott 
Paper as assignee.36  In its ensuing suit for infringement, Scott Paper asserted that Marcalus was 
estopped to defend its infringement of the patent on the basis of prior art anticipation because 
Marcalus was the assignor of Scott Paper’s patent.37  In other words, it was Scott Paper’s position 
that a party such as Marcalus cannot sell a patent, only to turn around and attack it on grounds of 
validity. 
Despite Scott Paper’s seemingly reasonable reliance on precedent to support this 
contention,38 the Court found that such a rule would undermine the very quid pro quo underlying 
the patent laws enacted by Congress.39  Since the public had already paid the price for disclosure 
of the expired patent’s technology, it had a vested interest in ensuring its free use.40  According to 
Chief Justice Stone’s majority opinion, it was irrelevant that only Marcalus would be affected by 
the rule, leaving the disclosed technology open to the general public for exploitation.  The 
opinion reasoned that “[i]f a manufacturer or user could restrict himself, by express contract, or 
by any action which would give rise to an ‘estoppel,’ from using the invention of an expired 
patent, he would deprive himself and the consuming public of the advantage to be derived from 
his free use of the disclosures.”41  Thus, the Court said “any attempted reservation or continuation 
in the patentee or those claiming under him of the patent monopoly, after the patent expires, 
whatever the legal device employed, runs counter to the policy and purpose of the patent laws.”42 
                                                     
34 Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945). 
35 Id. at 251. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 251-52.  Scott Paper relied on Westinghouse Co. v. Formica Co., which stated “an 
assignor of a patent right is estopped to attack the utility, novelty or validity of a patented 
invention which he has assigned or granted as against any one claiming the right under his 
assignment or grant. As to the rest of the world, the patent may have no efficacy and create no 
right of monopoly; but the assignor can not be heard to question the right of his assignee to 
exclude him from its use.”  266 U.S. 342, 349 (1924). 
39 Id. at 255-56. 
40 Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 256. 
41 Id. at 255-56 (emphasis added). 
42 Id. at 256. 
Because Scott Paper placed so much emphasis on ensuring unfettered access to the 
technology disclosed by an expired patent, the Brulotte Court latched onto this case as the main 
basis for its holding.43  But there is a crucial difference between the two cases.  Scott Paper was 
an action for patent infringement in which the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant on an 
estoppel theory.44  Brulotte was an action for royalties owed under contract in which the 
defendant sought to defend his actions on a patent misuse theory.45  This is significant because 
Scott Paper did not enunciate patent misuse as the reason for its holding, and not one case in the 
interim between Scott Paper and Brulotte cited it for such a purpose.46  In fact, the factual 
background of Scott Paper would not have allowed the case to be based on patent misuse since 
that doctrine only limits action by the holder of the patent in question,47 and the expired patent in 
Scott Paper was held by a party unrelated to the litigation.48  Thus, the Brulotte Court needed a 
doctrinal hook upon which to hang its new per se rule. 
The Court found that hook by simply analogizing the projection of royalty payments 
beyond the life of the patent to “an effort to enlarge the monopoly of the patent by tieing [sic.] the 
sale or use of the patented article to the purchase or use of unpatented ones.”49  Through this 
analogy—stated as though self-evident—the Court effectively fused the Scott Paper line of cases 
with a second line of cases invalidating tying arrangements50 to form this new version of patent 
misuse.  Whereas the concern in Scott Paper was protection of the public’s vested interest in free 
access to the disclosed technology,51 the concern in the tying cases was protection of the public 
from overreaching by the patentee beyond the scope of the patent grant.52  At the inception of this 
anti-tying doctrine in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., the Court 
viewed such arrangements as the “perfect instrument of favoritism and oppression.”53  While 
                                                     
43 See Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 31-32. 
44 Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 250. 
45 Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 30. 
46 See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 200 (1963); United States v. United States 
Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 94 (1950); MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 
402, 407 (1947); Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 400-01 
(1947).  But see Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 838-40 
(1950) (Douglas, J. dissenting, arguing that Scott Paper could support a finding of patent misuse). 
47 See Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 38 (1984) (O’Connor, J. 
concurring). 
48 See Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 251. 
49 Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 33. 
50 Id. (citing Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continental Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944), and Ethyl Gasoline 
Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940), as invalidating monopolistic tying arrangements). 
51 Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 256. 
52 See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942). 
53 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 515 (1917). 
Universal Film was purportedly based on the statutory language of the patent grant by 
Congress,54 the cases to follow relied more and more on policy considerations.55  Over time, 
several cases arose involving monopolists already violating antitrust laws and attempting to use 
patents to legitimize their tying arrangements.56  This progression eventually led the Court, 
speaking through Justice Douglas, to state in very broad terms:  “[w]here the sale of an 
unpatented product is tied to a patented article, that is a per se violation since it is a bald effort to 
enlarge the monopoly of the patent beyond its terms.”57 
Although Brulotte involved no allegations of antitrust violations,58 the Court swept that 
fact aside without comment and effortlessly categorized the hop-picking licenses at issue as per 
se illegal because they did in fact extract royalties in the post-expiration term.59  Hence, a new 
form of patent misuse was born. 
A Nonsensical Rule 
Regardless of whether traditional tying arrangements actually produce deleterious effects 
on competition,60 fear of the type of tying proscribed in Brulotte is unfounded because it is based 
on two faulty presumptions.  First, as in traditional tying cases, in order to use a patent as 
leverage into the post-expiration market, the patentee must have pre-expiration market power.  
Without this power in the pre-expiration market, the patentee would be unable to coerce licensees 
into promising their business in the post-expiration market.  While pre-expiration market power 
could exist in a given case, as the Court recognized in Northern Pacific Railway v. United States, 
it is definitely not the rule.61  Despite the label of “monopoly” given to patents, a patentee has no 
more market power by virtue of his patent than does the holder of a closely-guarded trade secret.  
                                                     
54 Id. at 514-15. 
55 See, e.g., Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 492 (“But the public policy which includes inventions within 
the granted monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in the invention.  It equally forbids 
the use of the patent to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent 
Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant.”). 
56 See, e.g., Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. 
United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456 (1940). 
57 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 259 (1963) (Douglas, J.). 
58 Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 38 n.3 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
59 Id. at 32. 
60 There is insufficient space in this iBrief to rehash the traditional tying debate. For more on this 
topic,  see Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1020 (Posner, C.J., giving a concise explanation of the argument 
in favor of tying arrangements). 
61 N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 10 n.8 (1958). 
Yet, the Court has consistently ignored competition among patentees in its tying cases,62 which 
amounts to a constructive presumption of market power conferred by the patent. 
Certainly, in Scheiber it is difficult to imagine that a musician-turned-inventor would 
have sufficient market power such that he could coerce Dolby into unwilling acceptance of a 
license extending beyond the term of his patents.  But even if such power existed, coercion was 
not present because Dolby approached Scheiber with the idea of an extended license agreement.63  
Without coercion as a factor, the Brulotte Court’s analogy between traditional tying and post-
expiration royalty agreements is undermined to a considerable degree. 
Second, for an extended-term patent license to have a deleterious effect on competition in 
the post-expiration market, the patent must enable the patentee to use power in the pre-expiration 
market to drive competition out of the post-expiration market.  In traditional tying arrangements, 
the theory is that a patentee is able to attain market power in the market for the unpatented article 
if he has power in the market for the patented article.  For example, if a salt manufacturer 
conditioned licenses for its patented salt canning machines upon the purchase of its unpatented 
salt, then the salt manufacturer could obtain market power in the unpatented salt market by using 
its power in the salt canning machine market to drive out competition.64 
Although the Brulotte Court implicitly presumes it is possible to use pre-expiration 
market power to drive out competition from the post-expiration market, Scheiber is certainly 
evidence that this is an erroneous presumption.  The fallacy lies in the fact that, unlike traditional 
tying arrangements, there is no third party for Scheiber to drive out.  In other words, this type of 
tying arrangement does not reduce the ability of others besides Dolby to compete in the post-
expiration market.  But Dolby, by agreeing to the longer royalty agreement, made reduced 
payments in the pre-expiration period and thus received an advantage during that time which it 
must pay for in the post-expiration period.65  So again, the analogy to traditional tying cases is 
undermined because these types of arrangements are not susceptible to being used to restrain 
competition. 
In addition to these two faulty presumptions underlying Brulotte, the per se rule of 
invalidity has perverse effects.  Since the various flavors of patent misuse are grounded on the 
premise that the patent grant conveys to patentees a power which may not be used contrary to the 
                                                     
62 Id. 
63 Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1016. 
64 See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 491-94. 
65 See Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1018 (“The parties could have agreed that Dolby would pay royalties 
for the next 100 years, but obviously the royalty rate would be minuscule...”). 
public interest,66 it seems logical to assume the Brulotte rule would act to further those interests.  
Yet, this is not the case. 
First, the Brulotte rule is detrimental to the quid pro quo underlying the entire patent 
system.  For example, say a person invents a revolutionary cure for baldness.  The formula is 
clearly worthy of a patent, but it is costly to manufacture and it is only effective on a small 
percentage of the balding population.  The inventor does an economic analysis and concludes that 
it will require thirty years to sell enough of his formula to this select demographic in order to 
show a profit.  Having consulted with his attorney, who is familiar with Brulotte, the inventor 
finds out that his formula cannot be patented and then licensed for a thirty–year block of time.  
Thus, the inventor’s only choice is to guard the formula as a trade secret and deprive the public of 
a valuable tool in the fight against baldness generally.  Such a situation is undesirable from a 
public policy point of view, but under Brulotte, the inventor has no other choice. 
Second, the Brulotte rule undermines the policy favoring self-help over litigation.  Taking 
Mr. Scheiber’s case as an example, when he originally sued Dolby for patent infringement the 
parties had two options:  either (1) pursue lengthy and costly litigation, or (2) pursue a mutually 
beneficial licensing agreement that happens to extend beyond the patent term.67  They clearly 
chose the latter because it was the most economically efficient solution.  For this choice, the 
parties should be applauded.  Instead, the Brulotte rule acts as a roadblock standing in the way of 
such efficient and favorable arrangements. 
Given the economic and logical nonsense of Brulotte, and more importantly, the 
perversity of its effect on public policy, it is clearly an undesirable rule. 
Congress is the Answer 
Because the Brulotte decision was based on policy considerations rather than on statutory 
interpretation,68 its lack of economic or logical sense is irrelevant if the granting clause of the 
patent statutes69 does not itself permit the arrangement struck down in Scheiber.  Indeed, it 
appears as though that is precisely the case.  According to the text of the clause, for a period of 
                                                     
66 See, e.g., Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494. 
67 Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1016. 
68 Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1018.  Although Brulotte does cite the granting clause of the patent 
stautes, 379 U.S. at 30, the clear basis for the holding is policy rather than statutory interpretation. 
69 The relevant statutes are:  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (“Every patent shall contain…a grant to the 
patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, 
or selling the invention…”); and 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (“…such grant shall be for a term 
beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the 
application for the patent was filed…”). 
twenty years a patentee is granted “the right to exclude others….”70  Once that term has passed, 
the right to exclude disappears.  In Scheiber, enforcement of the licensing agreement would 
plainly be just this sort of exclusion on Dolby’s ability to use the expired patent’s technology.  
Admittedly, this is rather simple-minded observation is one to which Chief Judge Posner would 
surely object.  In fact, he indirectly did just that in Scheiber.  Criticizing Brulotte, he said: 
The Supreme Court’s majority opinion reasoned that by extracting a 
promise to continue paying royalties after expiration of the patent, the 
patentee extends the patent beyond the term fixed in the patent statute 
and therefore in violation of the law. That is not true. After the patent 
expires, anyone can make the patented process or product without being 
guilty of patent infringement. The patent can no longer be used to 
exclude anybody from such production. Expiration thus accomplishes 
what it is supposed to accomplish. For a licensee in accordance with a 
provision in the license agreement to go on paying royalties after the 
patent expires does not extend the duration of the patent either 
technically or practically, because, as this case demonstrates, if the 
licensee agrees to continue paying royalties after the patent expires the 
royalty rate will be lower. The duration of the patent fixes the limit of the 
patentee's power to extract royalties; it is a detail whether he extracts 
them at a higher rate over a shorter period of time or a lower rate over a 
longer period of time.71 
 
While this is a sound argument from an economic perspective, it does nothing to address 
the very real restrictions imposed by the granting clause.  Customizing the clear import of 
statutory language cannot be justified merely because the legislation fails to produce optimal 
results.72  Had Congress meant to allow this type of agreement, different statutory language 
would be appropriate.  For instance, the granting clause could be modified to read: 
Every patent shall contain…a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, 
of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or 
selling the invention…and of the exclusive right to enter contracts 
providing for the manufacture, use, offers to sell, or sales of the 
invention… 
Certainly, if the granting clause proceeded in this manner, Scheiber would have an 
excellent statutory interpretation argument.  Of course, this particular wording may allow for 
some unforeseen pitfalls, but the idea is clear.  So long as the contract providing for the 
manufacture, use, etc. is entered into during the twenty-year period, the length of the agreement is 
                                                     
70 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
71 Scheiber, 293 F.3d at 1017. 
72 Somewhat ironically, Chief Judge Posner recognized this principle while addressing another 
issue in Scheiber:  “Congress isn’t constrained, as courts like to think they are, to rule logically.  
immaterial.  While a party such as Scheiber seeking to enforce his agreement would still need to 
confront Brulotte, at least the statutory language of the granting clause would support his 
argument.  In short, without modification of the granting clause by Congress, it is difficult to see 
how the Court could overrule the Brulotte rule of per se invalidity and remain consistent with the 
statutory language.73 
Conclusion 
Overall, it is a bad rule that patent licensing agreements cannot be used to collect 
royalties after the patent has expired.  As has been explained, the rationale behind this rule is 
fatally flawed and it has a perverse effect on public policy.  Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that 
overruling the case would be sufficient to remedy the situation since the statutory language of the 
granting clause is quite clear.  Therefore, unless Congress acts to change the statute’s wording, 
the world of patent law will be stuck with the Brulotte rule for quite some time. 
By: Michael Koenig 
                                                                                                                                                              
Most statutes are the product of compromise, and compromises need not cut at the logical joints 
of a controversy.”  293 F.3d at 1021. 
73 In a late-breaking development, the Supreme Court unanimously denied certiorari.  Scheiber v. 
Dolby Labs., 71 U.S.L.W. 3471 (2003).  While the denial contains no commentary, it seems 
likely that Chief Judge Posner’s criticism of the Brulotte rule did not escape the Court’s attention.  
Yet, because of the statutory language, it is not surprising that certiorari was denied. 
